Uganda's Speedy Motorbike Taxis Will Slow Down for Cash - If Incentives Are Cleverly Designed

Every day, 10 people die on the roads in Kampala, Uganda's capital. Road accidents cost Uganda US$1.2 billion each year. This amount is about 5% of the country's GDP. Most costs come from healthcare spending. Families struggle with medical bills, and businesses lose workers.

Motorbike taxis are popular in Uganda but cause many accidents. They account for 64% of all recorded road accidents, mainly due to speeding. Many motorbike taxi drivers speed for financial reasons. Faster speeds lead to more trips and higher income.

However, speeding is also influenced by social pressure among drivers. Most drivers are male and feel the need to show masculinity. Current methods to reduce speeding include fines and awareness campaigns, but they have not been effective.

My recent study in Kampala questions these traditional approaches to road safety. I am a behavioral economist, and my findings suggest that financial incentives can help if they provide socially acceptable reasons for slowing down. Publicizing these incentives allows drivers to justify safer behavior to their peers.

This approach can save lives and reduce healthcare costs. It also lowers fuel consumption and emissions while shifting harmful social norms around reckless driving.

My research shows that speeding among motorbike taxi drivers is a social decision as much as a financial one. Drivers work within tight-knit communities where reputation matters greatly. I surveyed 386 passengers who prefer safer drivers and would pay up to 8% more for careful driving.

Despite this preference, speeding remains common because it symbolizes status among drivers. In an experiment, I found that fast drivers were viewed as more skilled by their co-workers.

This creates a policy challenge: how can we encourage safe driving without harming drivers' reputations? To explore this, I conducted an experiment with 360 drivers offering two options:

1. A contract paying UGSh6,000 (US$1.64) daily for observing speed limits.
2. A lump sum cash payment with no conditions attached.

The framing of these choices was crucial. Some drivers knew their decisions would be private; others knew only the safe-driving contract would be public while the lump sum remained private.

A third group had fully public decisions where peers could see their choice between contracts.

The results showed that twice as many drivers accepted the safe-driving contract when it was public and justified slower speeds as financially motivated rather than fear-based.

To test if these contracts changed actual driving behavior, I conducted an impact experiment over six months after offering incentives for two weeks.

Drivers were randomly assigned one of three contracts:

1. A private safe-driving contract known only to them.
2. A public safe-driving contract visible to peers.
3. A control group receiving a simple cash payment with no conditions.

The results were striking: both safe-driving contracts reduced speeding significantly, but the public contract was nearly twice as effective as the private one.

Most significant reductions occurred in extreme speeding (80 km/h or more), which often leads to severe accidents.

The key takeaway is that visibility enhances incentive effectiveness when it provides justification for slower speeds without social consequences.